We propose a new notion of secure multiparty computation aided by a computationally-powerful but untrusted "cloud" server. In this notion that we call on-the-fly multiparty computation (MPC), the cloud can non-interactively perform arbitrary, dynamically chosen computations on data belonging to arbitrary sets of users chosen on-the-fly. All user's input data and intermediate results are protected from snooping by the cloud as well as other users. This extends the standard notion of fully homomorphic encryption (FHE), where users can only enlist the cloud's help in evaluating functions on their own encrypted data.
by the cloud as well as other users. This extends the standard notion of fully homomorphic encryption (FHE), where users can only enlist the cloud's help in evaluating functions on their own encrypted data.
In on-the-fly MPC, each user is involved only when initially uploading his (encrypted) data to the cloud, and in a final output decryption phase when outputs are revealed; the complexity of both is independent of the function being computed and the total number of users in the system. When users upload their data, they need not decide in advance which function will be computed, nor who they will compute with; they need only retroactively approve the eventually-chosen functions and on whose data the functions were evaluated.
This notion is qualitatively the best possible in minimizing interaction, since the users' interaction in the decryption stage is inevitable: we show that removing it would imply generic program obfuscation and is thus impossible.
Our contributions are two-fold:
1. We show how on-the-fly MPC can be achieved using a new type of encryption scheme that we call multikey FHE, which is capable of operating on inputs encrypted under multiple, unrelated keys. A ciphertext resulting from a multikey evaluation can be jointly decrypted using the secret keys of all the users involved in the computation.
2. We construct a multikey FHE scheme based on NTRU, a very efficient public-key encryption scheme proposed
INTRODUCTION
We are fast approaching a new digital era in which we store our data and perform our expensive computations remotely, on powerful servers -the "cloud", in popular parlance. While the cloud offers numerous advantages in costs and functionality, it raises grave questions of confidentiality, since data stored in the cloud could be vulnerable to snooping by the cloud provider or even by other cloud clients [43] . Since this data often contains sensitive information (e.g., personal conversations, medical information and organizational secrets), it is prudent for the users to encrypt their data before storing it in the cloud. Recent advances in fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) [20, 48, 12, 11, 21, 10] make it possible to perform arbitrary computations on encrypted data, thus enabling the prospect of personal computers and mobile devices as trusted but weak interfaces to a powerful but untrusted cloud on which the bulk of computing is performed.
FHE is only suitable in settings where the computations involve a single user, since it requires inputs to be encrypted under the same key. However, there are many scenarios where users, who have uploaded their large data stores to the cloud in encrypted form, then decide to compute some joint function of their data. For example, they may wish the cloud to compute joint statistical information on their databases, locate common files in their collections, run a computational agent to reach a decision based on their pooled data (without leaking anything but the final decision), or generally, in contexts where multiple (mutually distrusting) users need to pool together their data to achieve a common goal.
The multiparty scenario is significantly more complex, and comes with a set of natural but stringent requirements. First, the participants involved in the computation and the function to be computed may be dynamically chosen on-thefly, well after the data has been encrypted and uploaded to the cloud. Secondly, once the function is chosen, we should not expect the users to be online all the time, and consequently it is imperative that the cloud be able to perform the bulk of this computation (on the encrypted data belonging to the participants) non-interactively, without consulting the participants at all. Finally, all the burden of computation should indeed be carried by the cloud: the computational and communication complexity of the users should depend only on the size of the individual inputs and the output, and should be independent of both the complexity of the function computed and the total number of users in the system, both of which could be very large.
On-the-Fly Multiparty Computation
Consider a setting with a large universe of computationallyweak users and a powerful cloud. An on-the-fly multiparty computation protocol proceeds thus:
1. The numerous users each encrypt their data and upload them to the cloud, unaware of the identity or even the number of other users in the system. Additional data may arrive directly to the cloud, encrypted under users' public keys (e.g., as encrypted emails arriving to a cloud-based mailbox).
2. The cloud decides to evaluate an arbitrary dynamically chosen function on the data of arbitrary subset of users chosen on-the-fly. (The choice may be by some users' request, or as a service to compute the function on the data of parties fulfilling some criterion, or by a need autonomously anticipated by the cloud provider, etc.) The cloud can perform this computation noninteractively, without any further help from the users. The result is still encrypted.
3. The cloud and the subset of users whose data was used in the computation interact in a decryption phase. At this point the users retroactively approve the choice of function and the choice of peer users on whose data the function was evaluated, and cooperate to retrieve the output.
Crucially, the computation and communication of all the users (including the cloud) in the decryption phase should be independent of both the complexity of the function computed, and the size of the universe of parties (both of which can be enormous). Instead, the effort expended by the cloud and the users in this phase should depend only on the size of the output and the number of users who participated in the computation. Also crucially, the users need not be online at all during the bulk of the computation; they need to "wake up" only when it is time to decrypt the output.
We call this an on-the-fly multiparty computation (or onthe-fly MPC in short) to signify the fact that the functions to be computed on the encrypted data and the participants in the computation are both chosen on-the-fly and dynamically, without possibly even the knowledge of the participants. Protocols following this framework have additional desirable features such as the ability for users to "join" a computation asynchronously.
Possible Approaches (and Why They Do Not Work)
The long line of work on secure multiparty computation (MPC) [26, 5, 13, 49] does not seem to help us construct on-the-fly MPC protocols since the computational and communication complexities of all the parties in these protocols depends polynomially on the complexity of the function being computed.
1 In contrast, we are dealing with an asymmetric setting where the cloud computes a lot, but the users compute very little. (Nevertheless, we will use the traditional MPC protocols to interactively compute the decryption function at the end.)
Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) is appropriate in such an asymmetric setting of computing with the cloud. Yet, traditional FHE schemes are single-key in the sense that they can perform (arbitrarily complex) computations on inputs encrypted under the same key. In our setting, since the parties do not trust each other, they will most certainly not want to encrypt their inputs using each other's keys. Nevertheless, Gentry [19] proposed the following way of using single-key FHE schemes in order to do multiparty computation: first, the parties run a (short) MPC protocol to compute a joint public key, where the matching secret key is secret-shared among all the parties. The parties then encrypt their inputs under the joint public key and send the ciphertexts to the cloud who then uses the FHE scheme to compute an encryption of the result. Finally, the parties run yet another (short) MPC protocol to recover the result. A recent work by Asharov et al. [4] extends this schema and makes it efficient in terms of the concrete round, communication and computational complexity.
This line of work does not address the dynamic and noninteractive nature of on-the-fly MPC. In particular, once a subset of parties and a function are chosen, the protocols of [19, 4] require the parties to be online and run an interactive MPC protocol to generate a joint public key. In contrast, we require that once the function and a subset of parties is chosen, the cloud performs the (expensive) computations noninteractively, without help from any of the users. It would also be unsatisfactory to postpone the (lengthy) computation of the function until the interactive decryption phase; indeed, we require that once the users "wake up" for the decryption phase, the running time of all parties is independent of the complexity of the function being computed. Thus, even the feasibility of on-the-fly MPC is not addressed by existing techniques.
Our Solution
We present a new notion of fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) that we call a multikey FHE that permits computation on data encrypted under multiple unrelated keys; a new construction of multikey FHE based on the NTRU encryp-tion scheme (originally proposed by Hoffstein, Pipher and Silverman [30] ); and a new method of achieving on-the-fly multiparty computation (for any a-priori bounded number of users) using a multikey FHE scheme. Although the number of users involved in any computation has to be bounded in our solution, the total number of users in the system is arbitrary.
Our Results and Techniques

New Notion: Multikey Homomorphic Encryption
An N -key Fully Homomorphic Encryption scheme is the same as a regular FHE scheme with two changes. First, the homomorphic evaluation algorithm takes in polynomially many ciphertexts encrypted under at most N keys, together with the corresponding evaluation keys, and produces a ciphertext. Second, in order to decrypt the resulting ciphertext, one uses all the involved secret keys.
A multikey FHE scheme is indeed the right tool to perform on-the-fly MPC as shown by the following simple protocol: the users encrypt their inputs using their own public keys and send the ciphertexts to the cloud, the cloud then computes a dynamically chosen function on an arbitrary subset of parties using the multikey property of the FHE scheme, and finally, the users together run an interactive MPC protocol in order to decrypt. Note that the users can be offline during the bulk of the computation, and they need to participate only in the final cheap interactive decryption process. Note also that participants in the protocol need not be aware of the entire universe of users, but only those users that participate in a joint computation. This simple protocol provides us security against a semi-honest collusion of the cloud with an arbitrary subset of parties. We then show how to achieve security against a malicious adversary, using tools such as verifiable computation protocols [27, 18, 14, 3] or succinct argument systems [32, 36, 7, 28] .
The computation of the decryption function can itself be outsourced to the cloud. In particular, using the cloudassisted MPC protocol of Asharov et al. [4] yields a 5-round on-the-fly MPC protocol (one offline round, and four online rounds to perform decryption). As an additional benefit, in the resulting on-the-fly protocol, the parties may communicate with the server concurrently at each stage. The only disadvantage of this approach is that it requires a CRS setup. This does not, however, affect the on-the-fly nature of the procotol since only an apriori bound N on the number of computing parties needs to be known when creating the CRS.
(Multikey) Fully Homomorphic Encryption from NTRU
The starting point of our main construction of multikey FHE is the NTRU encryption scheme of Hoffstein, Pipher and Silverman [30] (more precisely, the slightly modified version due to Stehlé and Steinfeld [46] ). NTRU is one of the earliest lattice-based public-key encryption schemes, together with the Ajtai-Dwork cryptosystem [1] and the GoldreichGoldwasser-Halevi cryptosystem [25] . We first observe that NTRU can be made (single-key) fully homomorphic using the recent techniques of [11, 10] . Using some additional tricks, we then show that the scheme is multikey fully homomorphic for a bounded number of users at essentially the same cost. Previously, it was not even known whether NTRU could be turned into a (regular, single-key) fully homomorphic encryption scheme.
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This construction is one of our main contributions and we believe it to be of independent interest. Our construction is particularly interesting since the NTRU scheme was originally proposed as an efficient public-key encryption scheme, meant to replace RSA and elliptic curve cryptosystems in applications where computational efficiency is at a premium (for example, applications that run on smart cards and embedded systems). Although the transformation to a fully homomorphic system deteriorates the efficiency of NTRU somewhat, we believe that this system is a leading candidate for a practical FHE scheme. What's more, as we show, the scheme supports homomorphic operations on encryptions under multiple keys. Theorem 1.1 (Informal). For every N ∈ N, there is an N -user multikey fully homomorphic encryption scheme under the assumption that the NTRU encryption scheme (described below) is semantically secure and circular secure. The size of the keys and ciphertexts in the scheme grow polynomially with N .
We briefly sketch here our variant of the NTRU encryption scheme and the ideas in turning it into a multikey fully homomorphic encryption scheme. The reader is referred to Section 3 and Section 4 for a detailed exposition.
The main differences between the original NTRU scheme and our variant are threefold: (1) Whereas the original NTRU scheme adds a deterministic noise to the ciphertext, the variant considered here adds noise chosen from a distribution with bounded support (specifically, a discrete Gaussian distribution), a modification recently introduced by Stehlé and Steinfeld [46] . It seems that this could only improve security; indeed, the purpose of the Stehlé-Steinfeld work was to prove the security of NTRU based on worstcase hardness assumptions on ideal lattices, (2) We do all our operations modulo x n + 1 where n is a power of 2 as in [46] , as opposed to x n − 1 in the original NTRU. (3) Our parameters are more aggressive than in [30, 46] to support homomorphisms. As a result, the worst-case to average-case connection shown by [46] does not carry over to our setting of parameters.
For security parameter κ, the scheme is parametrized by a prime number q = q(κ), and a B-bounded error distribution χ over the ring R ≡ Z[x]/ x n + 1 (i.e., χ is a distribution over polynomials whose coefficients are all at most B(κ) in absolute value). The parameters n, q and χ are public. We show how to encrypt bits using the scheme. All operations in the scheme take place in the ring Rq ≡ R/qR. Keygen(1 κ ): Sample "bounded" polynomials f , g ← χ and set f := 2f + 1 so that f ≡ 1 (mod 2). Set the public key pk := h = 2gf −1 ∈ Rq and the secret key sk = f ∈ R. (If f is not invertible over Rq, resample f ).
Enc(pk, m): Sample "bounded" polynomials s, e ← χ. Output the ciphertext c := hs + 2e + m ∈ Rq.
Dec(sk, c): Let µ = f c ∈ Rq. Output µ (mod 2) as the message.
Decryption works since f c (mod q) = f (hs + 2e + m) (mod q)
where the last equality is true since |2(gs+ef )+f m| < q/2.
3 Taking this quantity mod 2 then gives us the message m since f ≡ 1 (mod 2). The multikey homomorphic properties of the scheme are best seen through the lens of the decryption equation (as in [11, 12] ). In particular, consider ciphertexts c1 = h1s1 + 2e1 + m1 ∈ Rq and c2 = h2s2 + 2e2 + m2 ∈ Rq that encrypt messages m1 and m2 under public keys h1 and h2 respectively, with noise terms e1 and e2. A little algebraic manipulation shows that c add = c1 + c2 and c mult = c1c2 are ciphertexts that encrypt the sum and product of m1 and m2, respectively, albeit with larger error terms. Namely, decrypting c1 + c2 and c1c2 with the "joint secret key" f1f2 (which is simply a product of the two secret keys f1 and f2) gives us:
This shows that decrypting c1 + c2 using the joint secret key f1f2 results in the sum of the two messages, assuming that the error does not grow to be too large. Likewise, we have:
This shows that decrypting c1c2 using the joint secret key f1f2 results in the product of the two messages, assuming that the error does not grow to be too large.
Extending this to circuits, we observe that the effective secret key required to decrypt a ciphertext c resulting from evaluating a multivariate polynomial function on the inputs of N users is
where di is the degree of the i th variable in the polynomial function. This makes the secret key required to decrypt c dependent on the circuit evaluated, which is unacceptable even for somewhat homomorphic encryption. We use the relinearization technique from [11] to transform the ciphertext into one that can be decrypted using the secret key N i=1 fi (namely, reduce all the exponents from di to 1), after every operation. In effect, this ensures that the secret key is related to the number of users N involved in the computation, and not to the function being computed. With the use of relinearization, one can show that the scheme is multikey somewhat homomorphic, i.e., capable of evaluating circuits of depth log n for some small constant < 1. (For more details, see Section 3).
To turn this into a fully homomorphic encryption scheme, we use the technique of modulus reduction from the work of Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan [11] , later refined in [10] . Modulus reduction shows how to reduce the magnitude of the error (while simultaneously reducing the size of the modulus). This technique works transparently in the multikey setting. The bottom line is that we can evaluate functions on N users as long as N ≈ log q/polylog(n). Put another way, for any number N of users, we get a N -user multikey FHE by setting q to be a large enough function of N . This gives us a leveled multikey FHE scheme. Finally, to turn this into a full-fledged multikey FHE scheme (whose complexity is independent of the complexity of the function being computed), we use (a multikey analog of) Gentry's bootstrapping technique [20] .
Our construction based on the NTRU encryption scheme raises a natural question: can any of the other FHE schemes be made multi-key? It turns out that the schemes of [19, 45, 48, 12, 11] can be made N -key fully homomorphic for a constant N , or sometimes even N = O(log n). We refer the reader to the full version for a detailed discussion of these schemes.
Completely Non-Interactive On-the-Fly MPC?
Our results raise the natural question of whether the protocols can be made completely non-interactive, namely the users do not ever have to talk to each other, even in the decryption phase. In the non-interactive setting, the server can always evaluate the circuit multiple times, keeping some parties' inputs but plugging in fake inputs of its choosing for the other parties (similarly to [29] ). However, by drawing on the impossibility of program obfuscation, we show that a non-interactive protocol cannot be achieved even if we accept this as the ideal functionality. Thus, our notion is qualitatively "the best possible" in terms of interaction. See the full version of this paper for a formal theorem statement.
Other Related Work
The basic idea of using homomorphic encryption schemes in conjunction with threshold decryption to boost the efficiency of MPC protocols was first noticed by Cramer, Dåm-gard and Nielsen [15] . The idea of using a cloud to alleviate the computational efforts of parties was recently explored in the work on "server-aided MPC" by Kamara, Mohassel and Raykova [31] . Their protocols, however, require some of the parties to do a large amount of computation, essentially proportional to the size of the function f being computed. Halevi, Lindell and Pinkas [29] recently considered the model of "secure computation on the web" wherein the goal is to minimize interaction between the parties. While their definition requires absolutely no interaction among the participants in the protocols (the participants interact with the server only), they show that this notion can only be achieved for a small class of functions. Our goal, on the other hand, is to compute arbitary functions with the assistance of a cloud.
Organization
In Section 2 we formally define multikey FHE and on-thefly MPC, and show our construction of on-the-fly MPC from multikey FHE. In Section 3 we show how to instantiate multikey somewhat homomorphic encryption from the NTRU encryption scheme, and then show how to achieve full homomorphism in Section 4.
Notation
In the remainder of the paper, we use the following notation. We use κ to denote the security parameter. For an integer n, we use the notation [n] to denote the set [n] = {1, . . . , n}. For a randomized function f , we write f (x; r) to denote the unique output of f on input x with random coins r. We write f (x) to denote a random variable for the output of f (x; r) over uniformly random coins r. For a distribution or random variable X, we write x ← X to denote the operation of sampling a random x according to X. For a set S, we overload notation and use s ← S to denote sampling s from the uniform distribution over S. We use y := f (x) to denote the deterministic evaluation of f on input x with output y. 
ON-THE-FLY MPC FROM MULTIKEY FHE
We consider the problem of a server or cloud, denoted by S, storing the data of U different parties P1, . . . , PU . We wish to ensure that the data of each party is kept private, but also allow the server S to compute any joint function of the data of any subset V ⊆ [U ] of the parties. We also wish to ensure that the server is able to do this with minimal participation from the parties in V , and no interaction at all from the rest of the parties [U ]\V . Furthermore, the communication complexity and the computation time of each party Pi should be independent of the complexity of the function since we rely on the computation power of the server, who will carry out the entire computation of the joint function F . The computation should remain secure even if the server or any set of parties are corrupted. We formalize this below.
For a class C of functions with at most U inputs, an onthe-fly multiparty protocol Π for C is a protocol between U + 1 interactive Turing Machines P1, . . . , PU , S, such that for all inputs x = (x1, . . . , xU ), all functions F ∈ C, if F is an N -input function then for all ordered subsets V ⊆ [U ] such that |V | = N , the output of Π in an execution where Pi is given xi as input (S does not receive an input), and F, V are chosen for the computation, is y = F ({xi}i∈V ). An onthe-fly multiparty protocol consists of two phases, an offline phase that is performed before the function F ∈ C is chosen, and an online phase that begins once F is chosen together with a subset V of inputs on which F will be evaluated. All parties P1, . . . , PU , S participate in the offline phase, but only the server S and parties in V participate in the online phase. After the function is selected, the server ignores all offline messages from non-computing parties (i.e. those in [U ]\V ).
Unlike in standard MPC, we require the communication complexity of the protocol, as well as the computation time of parties P1, . . . , PU to be independent of the complexity of the function F . Furthermore, we let the computation time of parties Pi for i ∈ V depend on the party's input and the output size of the F but require the computation time of parties Pi for i ∈ [U ]\V to depend only on the size of the party's input and be independent of the output size of F . On the other hand, the computation time of the server S must be linear in the circuit-size of F .
Security
We prove security of an on-the-fly MPC protocol in the Ideal/Real paradigm. Let F ({xi}i∈V ) for V ⊆ [U ] be the function to be computed, and let N = |V |. For ease of notation, we assume w.l.o.g. that V = [N ]. In the ideal world, the computation of F is performed through a trusted functionality F that receives input xi from each party Pi for i ∈ [U ], computes y = F (x1, . . . , xN ) (ignoring all inputs xi for i / ∈ V ) and gives y to parties P1, . . . , PN , S, while parties Pi for i ∈ [U ]\V do not get an output. Thus, in the ideal world, parties learn nothing more than y. In the real world, however, this trusted functionality does not exist and so in order to compute y = F (x1, . . . , xN ), parties P1, . . . , PU , S run a protocol Π.
An adversary corrupting a party (resp. the server) receives all messages directed to the corrupted party (resp. the server) and controls the messages that it sends. Since the server ignores messages from parties outside V , we assume w.l.o.g. that an adversary only corrupts computing parties, i.e. parties in V , and possibly the server.
We use IDEALF,S ( x) to denote the joint output of the ideal-world adversary S and the outputs of the server S and the parties P1, . . . , PN in an ideal execution with functionality F and inputs x = (x1, . . . , xU ). Similarly, we use REALΠ,A( x) to denote the joint output of the real-world adversary A and the outputs of parties P1, . . . , PN and server S in an execution of protocol Π with inputs x = (x1, . . . , xU ). We say that a protocol Π securely realizes F if for every real-world adversary A corrupting any t < N parties (and possibly the server), there exists an ideal-world adversary S with black-box access to A such that for all input vectors x, IDEALF,S ( x) c ≈ REALΠ,A( x).
Multikey Fully Homomorphic Encryption
In this section, we define multikey fully homomorphic encryption. Intuitively, multikey FHE allows us to evaluate any circuit on ciphertexts that might be encrypted under different public keys. To guarantee semantic security, decryption requires all of the corresponding secret keys.
We introduce a parameter N , which is the number of distinct keys that a scheme can tolerate. We let all algorithms depend polynomially on N . This is similar to the definition of "leveled" FHE from [10] . However, we note that in our definition, the algorithms depend on N but are independent of the depth of circuits that the scheme can evaluate. Thus, we consider schemes that are "leveled" with respect to the number of keys N , but fully homomorphic ("non-leveled") with respect to the circuits that are evaluated. The construction of multikey FHE schemes that are not leveled with respect to the number of keys (i.e., where all algorithms are independent of N ) remains an open problem.
We now define multikey FHE as follows, for restricted circuit classes and for arbitrary circuits. has the following properties:
• (pk, sk, ek) ← Keygen(1 κ ), for a security parameter κ, outputs a public key pk, a secret key sk and a (public) evaluation key ek.
• c ← Enc(pk, m), given a public key sk and message m, outputs a ciphertext c.
• m := Dec(sk1, . . . , skN , c), given N secret keys ski and a ciphertext c, outputs a message m .
• c * := Eval(C, (c1, pk 1 , ek1), . . . , (ct, pk t , ekt)), given a (description of ) a boolean circuit C along with t tuples (ci, pk i , eki), each comprising of a ciphertext ci, a public key pk i , and an evaluation key eki, outputs a ciphertext c * .
We require absence of decryption failures and compactness of ciphertexts. Formally: for every circuit C ∈ C, all sequences of N key tuples {(pk j , sk j , ek j )} j∈[N ] each of which is in the support of Keygen(1 κ ), all sequences of t key tuples {(pk i , ski, eki)} i∈[t] each of which is in {(pk j , sk j , ek j )} j∈ [N ] , and all plaintexts (m1, . . . , mt) and ciphertexts (c1, . . . , ct) such that ci is in the support of Enc(pk i , mi), Eval satisfies the following properties: Compactness: Let c * := Eval(C, (c1, pk 1 , ek1), . . . , (ct, pk t , ekt)). There exists a polynomial P such that |c * | ≤ P (κ, N ). In other words, the size of c * is independent of t and |C|. Note, however, that we allow the evaluated ciphertext to depend on the number of keys, N .
Definition 2.2. (Multikey FHE) A family of encryption schemes {E
(N ) = (Keygen, Enc, Dec, Eval)}N>0 is multikey fully homomorphic if it is multikey C-homomorphic for the class C of all circuits.
Semantic security of a multikey FHE follows directly from the semantic security of the underlying encryption scheme in the presence of the evaluation key ek. This is because given ek, the adversary can compute Eval himself. Note that taking N = 1 in Definition 2.1 and Definition 2.2 yield the standard definitions of C-homomorphic and fully homomorphic encryption schemes.
The Basic Protocol
Let {E (N ) = (Keygen, Enc, Dec, Eval)}N>0 be a multikey fully-homomorphic family of encryption schemes. We construct the following on-the-fly MPC protocol Π sh secure against semi-honest adversaries.
Step 1: For i ∈ [U ], party Pi samples a key tuple
and encrypts its input xi under pk i :
It sends (pk i , eki, ci) to the server S.
At this point a function F , represented as a circuit C, has been selected on inputs {xi}i∈V for some V ⊆ U . Let N = |V |. For ease of notation, assume w.
The parties proceed as follows.
Step 2: The server S computes
and broadcasts c * to parties P1, . . . , PN .
Step 3: The parties P1, . . . , PN run a secure MPC protocol Πdec sh to compute Dec(sk1, . . . , skN , c * ).
Theorem 2.1. Let {E (N ) = (Keygen, Enc, Dec, Eval)}N>0 be a multikey fully-homomorphic encryption scheme, and let Πdec sh be an N -party MPC protocol for computing the decryption function Dec(sk1, . . . , skN , c * ). If E is semantically secure, and Πdec sh is secure against semi-honest adversaries corrupting t < N parties, then the above construction is an on-the-fly MPC protocol secure against semi-honest adversaries corrupting t parties and possibly the server S.
Security Against Malicious Adversaries
The protocol described in Section 2.2 is not secure against malicious adversaries. Our first step in handling this type of attack is to replace our decryption protocol with one that is secure against malicious adversaries, which we will denote Πdec mal . Next, we will apply general MPC techniques to the rest of our protocol (Steps 1 and 2) to ensure parties do not deviate from the protocol. This requires coin-flipping and zero-knowledge proofs. However, there are two subtleties to consider.
1. First, recall that in our model, parties do not communicate with each other until the decryption phase.
In particular, parties do not communicate with each other (or even know about the existance of other parties) during Step 1. Therefore, coin-flipping in Step 1 is out of the question. Fortunately, the correctness property (from Definition 2.1) guarantees that the scheme is secure against corrupt parties that follow the protocol in Step 1 but adaptively choose their random coins. This means that parties do not need to coinflip for each other's random coins. Furthermore, since the server's computation throughout the protocol is deterministic, the parties do not need to coin-flip for the server's random coins.
We therefore only need to add zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge 5 to ensure that the parties indeed follow the protocol. The intuition behind this is that correctness will guarantee that the simulator can extract the inputxi for a corrupted party and therefore obtain the correct valueỹ from the ideal functionality, regardless of the coins used by the adversary.
2. Second, we wish to ensure that the computation time and communication complexity of the parties is small. This means that the server must be able to prove that he carried out the computation of Eval correctly in such a way that the parties can verify the validity of the proof in time that is much less than linear in the circuit size. To solve this problem, we use techniques from verifiable computation. We offer several solutions, each with its own benefits and drawbacks.
Verification for Small Inputs
We first consider the case where the ciphertexts (c1, . . . , cN ) are small enough to be broadcast to the N parties in V (i.e., allowing communication complexity linear in the total input size of the participating parties). In this case, the server needs to convince the participating parties that "c * = Eval(C, (c1, pk 1 , ek1), . . . , (cN , pk N , ekN ) )", i.e., that a deterministic circuit of size poly(|C|, κ) accepts. For any uniform circuit C (i.e., computable by a poly(κ)-time Turing machine), the following offer poly(κ, log(|C|)) communcation and verification efficiency. 1. Use the argument system of Kilian [32, 33] , yielding interactive 4-round verification. It relies on expensive PCPs.
2. Use Micali's CS proofs [36] . This reduces interaction to one round, but assumes a random oracle. It also relies on expensive PCPs.
3. Use the succint non-interactive arguments (SNARGs and SNARKs) of Bitansky et al. [7, 8] or Goldwasser at al. [28] . These are 1-round and hold in the standard model, but require a non-falsifiable assumption [38] .
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Some variants rely on PCPs, PIR or FHE.
In case that the evaluation circuit is in logspace-uniform NC, we have another alternative: 4. Use the argument system of Goldwasser et al. [27] for a 2-round solution. It relies on PIR.
In the case of arbitrary nonuniform poly(κ)-size circuits, one can use the technique of [6, Section 5.4] . First, in a preparatory phase, the circuit C is written down and its still be able to extract from the proofs created by the adverary on behalf of corrupt players. We therefore need to use simulation-extractable ZK proofs (SE-ZK), instead of ordinary ZK proofs of knowledge (ZK-POKs). However, in the interest of clarity, we choose to present the construction above with ZK-POKs instead of SE-ZK. 6 For any given family of C, |C| = poly(κ), and thus, poly(κ, log(|C|)) = poly(κ); but the degree of this polynomial depends on the circuit family. 7 A non-falsifiable assumption is necessary for the argument system to be non-interactive and secure in the standard model [23] . Note that we indeed require adaptive security, since the prover (ie. the server) is free to choose the statement to be proven (ie. the function to be computed).
collision-resistant hash digest d is computed by a trusted party or via an MPC protocol. Then, in step 3, the server proves the NP statement "there exists a circuit C whose digest is d and
This requires a succint argument system that is proof of knowledge and supports nondeterministic uniform circuits. This is satisfied by Micali's construction of CS proofs under Valiant's analysis [36, 47] , and by SNARKs [7, 8] .
Verification for Large Inputs
We can make communication and verification complexities depend merely polylogarithmically on the size of the relevant inputs x1, . . . , xN . In the aforementioned proofs of knowledge for nondeterministic statements [36, 47, 7, 8] , the complexity depends polynomially on the size of statement being proven (expressed as a nondeterministic Turing machine and its input), but merely polylogarithmically on the size of the witness for the statement, and in particular, the nondeterministic choices made by the Turing machine. We thus move ci from the instance into the witness. To recognize the correct ci, each party Pi remembers the digest of ci under a collision-resistant hash function family H = {H hk : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} κ }. In the offline stage, every party Pi draws hash key hki, computes the digest di = H hk i (ci), and sends (ci, hki, di) to the cloud. Each party Pi remembers its own (hki, di) but can forget the potentially long xi and ci. In the online stage, the server broadcasts (hk1, d1), . . . , (hkN , dN ) and proves the following NP statement: "there existc1, . . . ,cN such that di = H hk i (ci) and c * = Eval(C, (c1, pk 1 , ek1), . . . , (cN , pk N , ekN ) )". This is secure, since whenever the server convinces the clients, it actually "knows" suchc1, . . . ,cN which can be efficiently extracted from the server (by the arguments' proof of knowledge property); and these extractedci must be the ones originally sent by the parties (by the collision-resistance of H).
Protocol for Malicious Adversaries
The protocol for fully malicious adversaries is given below. Let {E (N ) = (Keygen, Enc, Dec, Eval)}N>0 be a multikey fully-homomorphic family of encryption schemes, and let H = {H hk : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} κ } be a family of collisionresistant hash functions. The following construction is an on-the-fly MPC protocol Π mal secure against malicious adversaries.
Step 1: For i ∈ [U ], party Pi samples a key tuple (pk i , ski, eki) := Keygen(1 κ ; ri) and encrypts its input xi under pk i :
ci := Enc(pk i , xi ; si)
It also samples a hash key hki and computes the digest of the ciphertext
It computes zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge π 
The server verifies all proofs {π
From this point forward, party Pi can forget its input xi and the ciphertext ci. It need only remember the hash key hki and digest di.
A function F , represented as a circuit C, is now selected on inputs {xi}i∈V for some V ⊆ U . Let N = |V |. For ease of notation, we assume w.l.o.g. that V = [N ].
and a short argument ϕ proving that "∃c1, . . . ,cN s.t. di = H hk i (ci) and
It broadcasts (c * , ϕ) to parties P1, . . . , PN , together with
Step 3: The parties P1, . . . , PN verify the argument ϕ and all proofs {π
. The parties run an MPC protocol Πdec mal to compute Dec(sk1, . . . , skN , c * ).
Theorem 2.2. Let {E (N ) = (Keygen, Enc, Dec, Eval)}N>0 be a multikey fully-homomorphic encryption scheme, and let Πdec mal be an N -party MPC protocol for computing the decryption function Dec(sk1, . . . , skN , c * ). Let H = {H hk : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} κ } be a family of collision-resistant hash functions. If E is semantically secure, and Πdec mal is secure against malicious adversaries corrupting t < N parties, then the above construction is an on-the-fly MPC protocol secure against malicious adversaries corrupting t parties and possibly the server S.
MULTIKEY SOMEWHAT HOMOMOR-PHIC ENCRYPTION BASED ON NTRU
We show how to construct a multikey somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme based on the NTRU encryption system first proposed by Hoffstein, Pipher, and Silverman [30] . More precisely, we rely on a variant of the NTRU scheme proposed by Stehlé and Steinfeld [46] .
In Section 3.1, we first review definitions and facts from the literature that we use extensively. In Section 3.2, we describe the encryption scheme. In Section 3.3, we discuss its security, and in Section 3.4 show that it is multikey somewhat homomorphic.
Preliminaries for the NTRU Instantiation
We work over rings R . = Z[x]/ φ(x) and Rq . = R/qR for some degree n integer polynomial φ(x) ∈ Z[x] and a prime integer q ∈ Z. Note that Rq ≡ Zq[x]/ φ(x) , i.e., the ring of degree n polynomials modulo φ(x) with coefficients in Zq. Addition in these rings is done component-wise in their coefficients (thus, their additive group is isomorphic to Z n and Z n q respectively). Multiplication is simply polynomial multiplication modulo φ(x) (and also q, in the case of the ring Rq). Thus an element in R (or Rq) can be viewed as a degree n polynomial over Z (or Zq). We represent such an element using the vector of its n coefficients, each in the range {− q 2 , ..., q 2 }. For an element a(x) = a0 + a1x + . . . + an−1x n−1 ∈ R, we let a ∞ = max |ai| denote its ∞ norm.
In this work, we set φ(x) = x n + 1 to be the n th cyclotomic polynomial, where n is a power of two. We use distributions over the ring Z[x]/ x n + 1 . To show the homomorphic properties of the scheme, the only property of these distributions we use is the magnitude of the polynomials' coefficients. Hence, we define a B-bounded distribution to be a distribution over R where the ∞-norm of a sample is bounded. We present some elementary facts about the Gaussian distribution and multiplication over the ring Z[x]/ x n + 1 . The first fact shows that the discrete Gaussian distribution over Z n with standard deviation r, denoted by D Z n ,r , outputs a (r √ n)-bounded polynomial with high probability. This allows us to define a truncated Gaussian distribution that is (r √ n)-bounded and statistically close to the discrete Gaussian. The second says that multiplication in the ring Z[x]/ x n + 1 increases the norm of the constituent elements only by a small amount.
Lemma 3.1 (see [37] , Theorem 4.4). Let n ∈ N. For any real number r > ω( √ log n), we have
Define the truncated discrete Gaussian distribution to be one that samples a polynomial according to the discrete Gaussian D Z n ,r and repeat the sampling if the polynomial is not (r √ n)-bounded. By Lemma 3.1, this distribution is statistically close to the discrete Gaussian. 
The Ring LWE Assumption
We describe a special case of the "ring learning with errors" assumption of Lyubaskevsky, Peikert and Regev [35] , which we will call RLWE. The RLWE assumption is analogous to the standard "learning with errors" (LWE) assumption, first defined by Regev [41, 42] (generalizing the learning parity with noise assumption of Blum et al. [9] ).
The RLWE φ,q,χ assumption is that for a random ring element s ← Rq, given any polynomial number of samples of the form (ai, bi = ai · s + ei) ∈ (Rq) 2 , where ai is uniformly random in Rq and ei is drawn from the error distribution χ, the bi's are computationally indistinguishable from uniform in Rq. We use the Hermite normal form of the assumption, as in [12] , where the secret s is sampled from the noise distribution χ rather than being uniform in Rq. This presentation is more useful for the purposes of this paper and it turns out to be equivalent to the original one up to obtaining one additional sample [2, 35] . = R/qR, and let χ denote a distribution over the ring R.
The decisional ring LWE assumption RLWE φ,q,χ states that for any = poly(κ) it holds that
where s is sampled from the noise distribution χ, ai are uniform in Rq, the "error polynomials" ei are sampled from the error distribution χ, and finally, the ring elements ui are uniformly random over Rq.
We use RLWE ( ) φ,q,χ to denote the assumption when the number of samples is fixed.
Fact 3.4. The RLWE φ,q,χ assumption implies that,
where ai, s, ei and ui are as in Definition 3.3.
Choice of Parameters
As already stated above, we will rely of the following specific choices of the polynomial φ(x) and the error distribution χ. For security parameter κ and a dimension parameter n = n(κ) which is a power of two:
• We set φ(x) to be the n th cyclotomic polynomial. This implies that φ(x) = x n + 1.
• The error distribution χ is the truncated discrete Gaussian distribution D Z n ,r for standard deviation r > 0. A sample from this distribution is a (r √ n)-bounded polynomial e ∈ R.
The Worst-case to Average-case Connection
We state a worst-case to average-case reduction from the shortest vector problem on ideal lattices to the RLWE problem for our setting of parameters. The reduction stated below is a special case of the results of [35] . Theorem 3.5 (A special case of [35] ). Let Φn(x) = x n + 1 be the n th cyclotomic polynomial where n is a power of two. Let r ≥ ω( √ log n) be a real number, and let q ≡ 1 (mod 2n) be a prime integer. Let R . = Z[x]/ x n + 1 . Then there is a randomized reduction from 2 ω(log n) · (q/r)-approximate R-SVP to RLWE φ,q,χ where χ = D Z n ,r is the discrete Gaussian distribution. The reduction runs in time poly(n, q).
The Scheme
We describe the NTRU encryption scheme [30] , with the modifications proposed by Stehlé and Steinfeld [46] . For a security parameter κ, the scheme is parametrized by the following quantities:
• an integer n = n(κ),
• a prime number q = q(κ),
• a degree-n polynomial φ(x) = φκ(x),
The parameters n, q, φ(x) and χ are public and we assume that given κ, there are polynomial-time algorithms that output n, q and φ(x), and sample from the error distribution χ. The message space is M = {0, 1}, and all operations on ciphertexts are carried out in the ring Rq (i.e. modulo q and φ(x)).
• Keygen(1 κ ) : Sample polynomials f , g ← χ and set f := 2f + 1 so that f ≡ 1 (mod 2). If f is not invertible in Rq, resample f . Set
• Enc(pk, m) : Sample polynomials s, e ← χ. Output the ciphertext c := hs + 2e + m ∈ Rq where all operations are done modulo q and φ(x).
• Dec(sk, c) :
It is easily seen that this scheme is correct as long as there is no wrap-around modulo q. To decrypt a ciphertext c, we compute in Rq: f c = f hs + 2f e + f m = 2gs + 2f e + f m If there is no wrap-around modulo q then f c (mod 2) = 2gs+2f e+f m (mod 2) = f m (mod 2) = m One possible setting which ensures that there is no wraparound modulo q is to set φ(x) = x n + 1. To see why this helps, notice that since the coefficients of g, s, f, e are all bounded by 2B + 1.
8 By Corollary 3.3, we know that the coefficients of gs (mod x n + 1) and f e (mod x n + 1) are both bounded by n(2B + 1)
2 . Thus, the coefficients of f c are bounded by 4n(2B + 1) 2 + B < 36nB 2 < q/2. In other words, as long as we set q > 72nB 2 , a fresh ciphertext generated by Enc is guaranteed to decrypt correctly. From here on, we refer to µ = f c ∈ Rq as the "error in a ciphertext c".
For the rest of our exposition, we will use φ(x) = x n + 1 as our modulus polynomial.
Security
We base the security of the encryption scheme in Section 3.2 on two assumptions -the RLWE assumption described in Section 3.1, as well as a new assumption that we call the (Decisional) Small Polynomial Ratio (DSPR) Assumption. Towards this end, we define the following problem.
be a polynomial of degree n, let q ∈ Z be a prime integer, and let χ denote a distribution over the ring R . = Z[x]/ φ(x) . The (decisional) small polynomial ratio problem DSPR φ,q,χ is to distinguish between the following two distributions:
• a polynomial h = g/f , where f and g are sampled from the distribution χ (conditioned on f being invertible over Rq = R/qR), and
• a polynomial h sampled uniformly at random over Rq.
Stehlé and Steinfeld [46] have shown that the DSPR φ,q,χ problem is hard even for unbounded adversaries (namely, the two distributions above are statistically close) if n is a power of two, φ(x) = x n + 1 is the n th cyclotomic polynomial, and χ is the discrete Gaussian D Z n ,r for r > √ q · poly(n). This allowed them to prove semantic security for the modified NTRU scheme described in Section 3.2 under the RLWE φ,q,χ assumption alone.
The security proof follows by a hybrid argument, in two steps.
1. The hardness of DSPR φ,q,χ allows us to change the public key h = 2g/f to h = 2h for a uniformly sampled h .
2. Once this is done, we can use RLWE φ,q,χ to change the challenge ciphertext c * = hs + 2e + m to c * = u + m, where u is uniformly sampled from Rq.
In this final hybrid, the advantage of the adversary is exactly 1/2 since c * is uniform over Rq, independent of the message m.
Unfortunately, their result holds only if r > √ q · poly(n), which is too large to permit even a single homomorphic multiplication. To support homomorphic operations, we need to use a much smaller value of r, for which it is easy to see that the DSPR φ,q,χ assumption does not hold in a statistical sense any more. This makes it necessary for us to assume that the decisional small polynomial ratios problem is hard for our choice of parameters, which we refer to as the DSPR φ,q,χ assumption.
Using the same security proof as in [46] , we can base the security of the scheme in Section 3.2 on the DSPR assumption and the RLWE assumption. With the choice of parameters stated below, this yields security under the DSPR assumption and the hardness of approximating shortest vectors on ideal lattices to within a factor of 2 n , which is believed to be hard. Lemma 3.6. Let n be a power of two, let φ(x) = x n + 1, let q = 2 n for ∈ (0, 1) and χ = D Z n ,r with r = poly(n). Then, the (modified) NTRU encryption scheme described in Section 3.2 is secure under the DSPR φ,q,χ assumption and the worst-case hardness of approximating shortest vectors on ideal lattices (over the ring R . = Z[x]/ φ(x) ) to within a factor of 2 Ω(n ) .
Multikey Homomorphism
Let (h1, f1) and (h2, f2) be two different public/secret key pairs, and let c1 = h1s1 + 2e1 + m1 and c2 = h2s2 + 2e2 + m2 be two ciphertexts, encrypted under public keys h1 and h2, respectively. We show how to compute ciphertexts that decrypt to the sum and the product of m1 and m2. In particular, we show that the "ciphertexts" c mult .
= c1 · c2 and c add .
= c1 + c2 can be decrypted to the product and the sum of m1 and m2 respectively, using the secret key f12
To see this, note that as long as there is no wrap-around modulo q, f1f2(c1 + c2) (mod 2) = 2(f1f2(e1 + e2) + f2g1s1 + f1g2s2)
and f1f2(c1c2) (mod 2) = 2(2g1g2s1s2 + g1s1f2(2e2 + m2) + g2s2f1(2e1 + m1) + f1f2(e1m2 + e2m1 + 2e1e2)) + f1f2(m1m2) (mod 2) = m1m2 (mod 2) since f1 ≡ 1 (mod 2) and f2 ≡ 1 (mod 2).
In other words, the "joint secret key" f12 . = f1f2 can be used to decrypt c add . = c1 + c2 and c mult . = c1 · c2. We can extend this argument to any combination of operations, with ciphertexts encrypted under multiple public keys.
Of course, the error in the ciphertexts will grow with the number of operations performed (as with all known fully homomorphic encryption schemes). Thus, correctness of decryption will only hold for a limited number of operations. We can show that the scheme can correctly evaluate circuits of depth roughly log(n) when q = 2 n and B = poly(n). However, an astute reader would have observed by now that in order to successfully decrypt a ciphertext that was the result of a homomorphic evaluation, we must know the circuit that was evaluated. For example, to decrypt c 2 1 + c2 we need to multiply it by f 2 1 f2, whereas to decrypt c1 +c 2 2 we need to multiply by f1f 2 2 . This is obviously unsatisfactory. Furthermore, consider what happens when we add or multiply two ciphertexts c, c that are themselves a result of homomorphic evaluation. Suppose, for example, that c = c1c2 and c = c2c3, where ci is encrypted under hi for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. We know c can be decrypted using f1f2 and c can be decrypted using f2f3. Thus, we know that f1f2 · c = 2e + m f2f3 · c = 2e + m for some messages m and m and error terms e and e . Following the discussion above, we can see that c + c can be decrypted using the key f1f2f3. In general, given a ciphertext c encrypted under a set of keys K, and c encrypted under a set of keys K , their sum can be decrypted using the product of the keys in K ∪ K . The absolute magnitude of the entries in this product grows exponentially with the number of keys in K ∪ K .
Analogously, in the context of homomorphic multiplication, we need f1f 2 2 f3 to decrypt c · c . This hints at the fact that the size of the (joint) secret key needed to decrypt an evaluated ciphertext grows exponentially with the degree of the evaluated circuit (and not just with the number of parties involved, as in the case of addition). Indeed, after D multiplications, the (joint) secret key needed to decrypt will be the product of D polynomials, and the magnitude of the coefficients in this product will be exponential in D.
It is beneficial, especially for our constructions in Section 4 that we eliminate the exponential dependence (of the magnitude of the coefficients of the joint secret key) on the degree D. We remark that we will not succeed in eliminating the exponential dependence on N , the number of users -indeed, this is the reason why our solution will eventually assume an a-priori upper bound on N .
This motivates our use of relinearization, a technique first introduced by Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan [11] . Informally, we will introduce a (public) evaluation key ek that will be output by the Keygen algorithm. Every time we multiply ciphertexts that share a key fi, we will use the evaluation key to ensure that we only need fi, and not f 2 i , to decrypt the new ciphertext. This ensures two things.
1. First, it ensures that to decrypt a ciphertext c * , we only need to multiply it by one copy of each secret key, making decryption independent of the circuit used to produce c * .
2. Second, it ensures that the size of the (joint) secret key needed to decrypt depends only on the number of keys N , and not on the circuit C that was evaluated.
We present below our modified scheme, as well as the Eval algorithm.
• Keygen(1 κ ) : Sample f , g ← χ and set f := 2f + 1 so that f ≡ 1 (mod 2). If f is not invertible in Rq, resample f . Set
For all τ ∈ {0, . . . , log q }, sample sτ , eτ ← χ and compute γτ = hsτ + 2eτ + 2 τ f ∈ Rq. Set ek = (γ0, . . . , γ log q ) ∈ R log
• Enc(pk, m) : Sample s, e ← χ. Output the ciphertext c := hs + 2e + m ∈ Rq.
• Dec(sk1, . . . , skN , c) :
• Eval(C, (c1, pk 1 , ek1), . . . , (ct, pk t , ekt)): We show how to evaluate a t-input circuit C. To this end, we show how to homomorphically add and multiply two elements in {0, 1}. Given two ciphertexts c1, c2, we assume that we also have a set of distinct public keys associated with each ciphertext. 9 We will denote these lists by K1, K2, respectively. The public-key set of a fresh encryption is simply the set {pk} containing the public key under which it was encrypted.
Given two ciphertexts c1 and c2 with corresponding public-key sets K1 and K2, output the ciphertext
as an encryption of the sum of the underlying messages. Output the set K add = K1 ∪ K2 as its corresponding public-key set.
Given two ciphertexts c1 and c2 with corresponding public-key sets K1 and K2, compute ciphertext c0 = c1 · c2 ∈ Rq, and let K1 ∩ K2 = {pk i 1 , . . . , pk ir }.
-If K1 ∩ K2 = ∅, let c mult = c0.
-Otherwise, for j ∈ [r] and τ = {0, . . . , log q }, define cj−1,τ so that
is the binary representation of cj−1. Parse
and let
At the end of the iteration, let c mult = cr.
In either case, output c mult as an encryption of the product of the underlying messages, and output the set K mult = K1 ∪ K2 as its corresponding public-key set.
We first show that the scheme works correctly as advertised:
n for ∈ (0, 1) and χ is a Bbounded distribution for B = poly(n), then the (modified) NTRU encryption scheme described above is multikey homomorphic for N = O n δ keys and circuits of depth d < ( − δ) log n − log log n − O(1).
Proof. The main step in the proof of correctness is to show that a homomorphic operation increases the error from η to at most η 2 + (B · poly(n)) O(N ) . Putting this together with the fact that successful decryption requires the error to be smaller than q/2 gives us the statement of the lemma.
We first compute how much the error in a ciphertext grows with a homomorphic multiplication. Let c and c be ciphertexts that decrypt to m and m , under two sets of secret keys K and K respectively. Let fK (resp. f K ) denote the product i∈K fi (resp. i∈K fi). Then, we have: 
Thus, the error in the ciphertext c mult is at most ηη , and it decrypts to the product of the two messages mm as long as the error is not too large.
We now move to analyzing the additional error introduced by relinearization. Let K ∩ K = {i1, . . . , ir}. Then, the "joint decryption key" fK f K contains the term f −1 for j = 1, . . . , r. Thus, Fr is a simple product of the secret keys fi, without any quadratic terms.
We show that the ciphertext cj decrypts to the message mm , and has error at most ηη + j · (8 log q(nB) 2N +2 ). The base case (i.e., j = 0) follows from Equation 1 since c0 = c mult . In general, we have:
Now,
where |Eτ | ≤ 2nB 2 . Substituting back into Equation 2, we get
Since Fj−1 cj−1 is exactly mm plus an even error (by the inductive assumption), this shows that cj decrypts to mm as well, under the secret key Fj. It remains to compute the error in the ciphertext cj. Since Fj−1f
is a product of at most 2N small polynomials, it has ∞ norm at most (nB) 2N , by Corollary 3.3. Thus, the error is at most
Thus, the final error after a multiplication and relinearization is at most ηη + 8N log q · (nB)
as claimed, for the setting of q = 2 n . For a circuit of depth d and an initial error η0, the error grows to at most
after homomorphic evaluation. This results in correct decryption as long as d < log log q − (log log n + log N + O(1)). In particular, for N = O(n δ ) keys and q = 2 n , we get d < ( − δ) log n − log log n − O(1).
The main difference between the scheme in Section 3.2 and the one in this section in terms of security is in the evaluation key ek. The evaluation key contains the elements
which can be thought of as "pseudo-encryptions" of multiples of the secret key f under the corresponding public key h. We point out that these are not true encryptions of the "message" 2 τ f since 2 τ f is not a binary polynomial, whereas our scheme is only equipped to correctly encrypt polynomi-
The security of the scheme then relies on a "circular security" assumption which states that semantic security of the scheme is maintained given the evaluation key as constructed above. We remark that this assumption can be avoided at the cost of obtaining a leveled homomorphic encryption scheme (where the size of the evaluation key grows with the depth of the circuits that the scheme supports).
In Section 4 we show how to convert this somewhat homomorphic scheme into a multi-key fully homomorphic one. In the same section, we also discuss any additional assumptions we need to make to maintain security.
FROM SOMEWHAT TO FULLY HOMO-MORPHIC ENCRYPTION
We use Gentry's bootstrapping theorem [20, 19] to convert a multikey somewhat homomorphic scheme into a multikey fully homomorphic one. Unfortunately, as we will see, we cannot apply the bootstrapping theorem directly to the somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme from Section 3. We therefore turn to modulus reduction, a technique introduced by [11, 10] , to convert our somewhat homomorphic scheme into a bootstrappable scheme. We first describe the bootstrapping theorem, and then present the modulus reduction technique and how we can apply it in our case.
Bootstrapping
We remind the reader of the definition of a bootstrappable encryption scheme and present Gentry's bootstrapping theorem [20, 19] that states that a bootstrappable scheme can be converted into a fully homomorphic one. We modify the theorem and the corresponding definitions from their original presentation to generalize it to the multikey setting. Taking N = 1 yields the theorem and the definitions from [20, 19] .
(N ) = (Keygen, Enc, Dec, Eval)}N>0 be a family of multikey C-homomorphic encryption schemes, and let f add and f mult be the the augmented decryption functions of the scheme defined as
mult } c 1 ,c 2 ⊆ C . Namely, the scheme can homomorphically evaluate f add and f mult .
We first define the notion of weak circular security, and then describe our generalization of Gentry's bootstrapping theorem. Namely, no polynomial time adversary can distinguish an encryption of 0 from an encryption of 1 even given the additional information. We now state a generalization of Gentry's bootstrapping theorem to the multi-key setting.
Theorem 4.1. (Multikey Bootstrapping Theorem) Let E be a bootstrappable family of multikey homomorphic schemes that is also weakly circular secure. Then there is a multikey fully homomorphic family E of encryption schemes.
The idea behind (multi-key) bootstrapping is that given a public evaluation key that consists of encryptions of all bits of all secret keys, αj,i = Enc(pk j , skj[i]), we can evaluate circuits of any depth by periodically "refreshing" the evaluated ciphertext c. Simply evaluate the decryption circuit Dec(sk1, . . . , skN , c) homomorphically using the evaluation key {αj,i = Enc(pk j , skj[i])}. The result is a ciphertext c * that encrypts the same plaintext as c and can again be decrypted using sk1, . . . , skN , but has much smaller noise. Thus, after this refreshing step, we can continue evaluating homomorphically for a few more levels before the noise grows again and we need to apply the refreshing procedure once more.
Unfortunately, the somewhat homomorphic scheme that we described in Section 3 is not bootstrappable. Recall that we can only evaluate circuits of depth less than log(n), where < 1. However, the shallowest implementation of the decryption circuit we are aware of has depth c log N · log n for some constant c > 1. We therefore turn to modulus reduction, which will allow us to convert our somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme into a bootstrappable scheme.
Modulus Reduction
Modulus reduction [11, 10] is a noise-management technique that provides an exponential gain on the depth of the circuits that can be evaluated, while keeping the depth of the decryption circuit unchanged. Informally, if d dec is the depth of the decryption circuit of the multikey scheme described in Section 3.4, then we modify the scheme so that its decryption circuit is unchanged but the scheme can now evaluate circuits of depth d dec . Hence, the new scheme can evaluate its own decryption circuit, making it bootstrappable. Details follow.
We let [ · ]q denote the corresponding element in Rq (ie. reducing modulo φ(x) and q), as in [10] . Then, if (h, f ) is a key pair and c is a ciphertext under public key h, [ f c ]q corresponds to the "noise" in c. Recall that for decryption to be successful, we need [ f c ]q to be equal to f c over the integers. However, each homomorphic operation increases this noise. Modulus reduction allows us to keep the noise magnitude small by simply scaling the ciphertext after each operation. The key idea is to exploit the difference in how the noise affects security and homomorphisms:
• The growth of noise upon homomorphic multiplication is governed by the magnitude of the noise.
• Security is governed by the ratio between the magnitude of the noise and the modulus q.
This suggests a method of reducing the magnitude of the noise and the modulus by roughly the same factor, thus preserving security while at the same time making homomorphic multiplications "easier".
In particular, modulus reduction gives us a way to transform a ciphertext c ∈ Rq into a different ciphertext c ∈ Rp (where p is smaller than q) while preserving correctness: for "joint" secret key f =
The transformation from c to c involves simply scaling by (p/q) and rounding appropriately. Lemma 4.2 ( [11, 10] ). Let p and q be two odd moduli, and let c ∈ Rq. Define c to be the polynomial in Rp closest to (p/q) · c such that c ≡ c (mod 2). Then, for any f with
where f ∞ and f 1 are the ∞ and 1 norms of f , respectively.
The beauty of Lemma 4.2 is that if we know the depth d of the circuit we want to evaluate (in our case, d = d dec , the depth of the augmented decryption circuit), then we can construct a ladder of decreasing moduli q0, . . . , q d and perform modulus reduction after each operation so that at level i all ciphertexts reside in Rq i and the magnitude of the noise at each level is small. In particular, this is true at level d so that once the evaluation is complete, it is possible to decrypt the resulting ciphertext without decryption errors.
Bootstrappable Scheme
We change the scheme so that it uses modulus reduction during the evaluation. Keygen will now sample a ladder of decreasing moduli q0, . . . q d dec . We will choose the distribution χ in order to guarantee that any sample is B-bounded, where B q d dec . The modified scheme is as below.
• Keygen ( • Eval(C, (c1, pk 1 , ek1), . . . , (ct, pk t , ekt)): We show how to evaluate a t-input circuit C. We assume w.l.o.g. that the circuit C is leveled in that it is composed of alternating XOR and AND levels.
We show how to homomorphically add and multiply two elements in {0, 1}. Given two ciphertexts c1, c2, we assume that we also have a set of distinct public keys associated with each ciphertext. 10 We will denote these lists by K1, K2, respectively. The public-key set of a fresh encryption is simply the set {pk} containing the public key under which it was encrypted.
-Given two ciphertexts c1, c2 ∈ Rq i with corresponding public-key sets K1, K2, compute c = c1 + c2 ∈ Rq i and let K1 ∪ K2 = {pk j 1 , . . . , pk jr }. For = 1, . . . , r and τ ∈ {0, . . . , log qi }, define c −1,τ so that 10 That is, we assume each set contains distinct public keys, but the intersection of any two sets might not be empty.
Finally, reduce the modulus: let c add be the integer vector closest to (qi+1/qi) · cr such that c add ≡ cr (mod 2). Output c add ∈ Rq i+1 as an encryption of the sum of the underlying messages. Output the set K add := K1 ∪K2 as its corresponding public-key set.
-Given two ciphertexts c1, c2 ∈ Rq i with corresponding public-key sets K1, K2, compute ciphertext c0 = c1 · c2 ∈ Rq i , and let K1 ∪ K2 = {pk j 1 , . . . , pk jr }. For = 1, . . . , r and τ ∈ {0, . . . , log qi }, define c −1,τ so that Finally, reduce the modulus. Let c mult be the integer vector closest to (qi+1/qi) · cr such that c mult ≡ cr (mod 2). Output c mult ∈ Rq i+1 as an encryption of the product of the underlying messages, and output the set K mult := K1 ∪ K2 as its corresponding public-key set.
We can now show the following lemma, whose proof is deferred to the full version. Lemma 4.3. If q = 2 n for ∈ (0, 1) and χ is a Bbounded distribution for B = poly(n), then the (modified) NTRU encryption scheme described above is multikey homomorphic for N keys and circuits of depth d as long as N d = O (n / log n).
Multikey Fully Homomorphic Encryption
To turn this into a fully homomorphic encryption scheme, we use the (multi-key) bootstrapping theorem (Theorem 4.1), but first, we show an upper bound on the depth of the decryption circuit.
Lemma 4.4. The decryption circuit for the scheme above for N keys can be implemented as a polynomial-size arithmetic circuit over GF (2) of depth O(log N (log log q+log n)).
Proof. The decryption circuit for a ciphertext encrypted under N keys can be written as
Multiplying two polynomials over Rq can be done using a polynomial-size Boolean circuit of depth O(log log q + log n) (see, e.g., [11, Lemma 4 .5] for a proof). Using a binary tree of polynomial multiplications, the decryption operation above can then be done in depth O(log N (log log q + log n)), as claimed.
This means that the modified scheme is bootstrappable, and therefore applying the bootstrapping theorem gives us: Theorem 4.5. For every N ∈ N, let B = poly(n), χ to be a B-bounded distribution, and q = 2 Ω(N log N ·log 2 n) .
Then, there exists a multikey fully homomorphic encryption scheme for N keys, secure under the DSPR φ,q,χ and RLWE φ,q,χ assumptions.
Proof. To apply Theorem 4.1, we require that the depth of the decryption circuit is smaller than the depth of the circuits that the scheme can evaluate. That is, log N · (log log q + log n) < C · log q N · log n for some universal constant C > 0, which holds for the parameter settings in the statement of the theorem.
In particular, this scheme maintains security as long as q = 2 n 1−δ for some δ > 0, thus supporting as many as N = n 1−δ / log O(1) n users.
Finally, we remark that bootstrapping (and therefore assuming weak circular security) can be avoided at the cost of obtaining a leveled homomorphic encryption scheme (where the size of the evaluation key grows with the depth of the circuits that the scheme supports).
